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John Koenig’s long-running project, The Dictionary of Ob-
scure Sorrows, aims to create new words that capture otherwise 
abstract emotions which often escape easy description - words 
like ‘vellichor’ (“the strange wistfulness of used bookstores”), 
‘silience’ (the “unnoticed excellence that carries on around you 
every day, unremarkably”), and ‘kuebiko’ (“a state of exhaus-
tion inspired by acts of senseless violence”). Featured by or-
ganizations like TED and NPR, one of Koenig’s most famous 
neologisms is ‘sonder,’ the feeling in the moment that “each 
random passerby is living a life as vivid and complex as your 
own.’ Christine Korsgaard’s new book Fellow Creatures: Our 
Obligations to the Other Animals aims to expand this percep-
tion of the value of another to include all creatures which have 
interests of their own - regardless of the species to which they 
happen to belong.
Laid out in three parts, this relatively short book offers a 
dense reformulation of one of the more notorious elements of 
Kant’s normative position in its 250-odd pages, arguing that 
humans do have moral duties to nonhuman animals. Whereas 
Kant grounded much of his moral theory on a supposed need 
for reciprocity between moral agents, Korsgaard argues that 
there is no reason to suppose, on Kantian grounds, that a one-
sided relational duty is not possible if we have good reasons 
for thinking that the object of that duty has moral standing. As 
she develops throughout Part One, any creature which has what 
she calls a ‘final good’ also has moral standing, regardless of 
whether or not that creature can conceptualize or respect either 
its own final good or the final good of others.
Derived from her reading of Aristotle, Korsgaard’s sense 
of ‘final goods’ is contrastable with the notion of a functional 
good: whereas the latter captures evaluative uses of the con-
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cept ‘good’ (as we typically apply it in ordinary discourse), the 
former entails that we consider something “worth having, real-
izing, or bringing about for its own sake” (2.1.3). By defining an 
animal as something with a representational system that per-
ceives the world in a ‘valenced’ manner and acts based on that 
information (2.1.7), Korsgaard concludes that all animals, by 
definition, experience both functional and final goods insofar 
as valenced perceptions motivate actions. So, if Kantians are 
going to ground morality as the preservation of, or respect for, 
final goods (another way to express, she argues, the requirement 
to treat people as “ends in themselves”), then there is no reason 
to care about what species a given final-goods-holder happens 
to be.
To this sense of ‘good,’ Korsgaard adds the important notion 
that a good is ‘tethered’ to a particular creature in a particular 
context; that is to say, if something is important for a creature, 
“it cannot be cut loose from that creature without ceasing to be 
important at all” (1.3.2). Put differently, Korsgaard denies that 
goodness simply exists on its own; to be good is to be good for 
someone or something specific and there is “no real difference 
between being absolute and being relative to everyone” (1.3.2). 
Ultimately, she concludes that all value is perspectival, for “...
values arise from the point of view of valuing creatures. And 
the values that arise from one point of view can be discordant 
with values that arise from another….[W]e can see the ethi-
cal life as an attempt to bring some unity or harmony into our 
various evaluative perspectives, by choosing those ends that are 
good for all of us” (4.5.1).
This perspectival understanding of goodness allows Kors-
gaard to reject several of the perpetual bugbears of conversa-
tions about human-animal-relations on the grounds that deter-
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minations of comparative value are often incommensurable: 
how could one compare a ‘good-for X’ and a ‘good-for Y’ if the 
content of ‘good-for’ in each case is fundamentally different, 
given that X and Y are different? Consequently, Korsgaard con-
cludes that a sentence like “humans are more important than 
animals” can be neither true nor false, thereby sweeping much 
of the debate about ‘speciesism’ off the agenda for discussion 
(4.3.6). Similarly, debates about the supposed superiority of par-
ticular capacities are meaningless; it’s not that Korsgaard dis-
agrees with Mill’s famous claim that “it is better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied,” but rather that she insists on 
asking “better for whom?” with the understanding that a pig’s 
perspective on “the Good Life” involves much more straw than 
poetry (4.4.3).
In Part Two, Korsgaard specifically critiques Kant’s notion of 
duty in light of her perspectival definition of goodness as teth-
ered to particular creatures and their situations. Kant thought, 
because they cannot reciprocate the legislation of our moral 
laws back upon us, nonhuman animals could not properly pos-
sess moral standing within the Kingdom of Ends, so any real 
duties that humans have with respect to animals, such as the 
duty to not kill a farmer’s cow, are actually indirect duties to 
other human beings - the duty is to the farmer, not the cow 
(6.2.2). In contrast, Korsgaard argues that the way in which hu-
mans derive moral laws for ourselves - in particular, the way 
in which we conceive of a being possessing moral standing - if 
applied consistently, happens to include nonhumans or, as she 
says, “rational beings legislate moral laws whose protections 
extend to the other animals” (8.1.1).
This is because of a crucial distinction Korsgaard makes be-
tween the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sense of being an “end in itself.” 
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Much like the difference between being a moral agent and a 
moral patient, to actively be such an end is to be capable of do-
ing the legislating of moral laws upon others; to be passive is to 
be the recipient of such considerations (8.5.1). Korsgaard con-
tends that Kant conflated these two facets of end-legislation, but 
when they are distinguished they can easily expand his King-
dom of Ends to incorporate any creature that has a final good. If 
any final goods matter to a Kantian, then they all must matter; 
in Korsgaard’s words, “the content of the presupposition behind 
rational choice is not automatically given by the fact that it is 
only rational beings who have to make it” (8.5.1).
A concerning problem, then, in light of her commitment to 
perspectival value, concerns the inevitable conflict of valuing 
agents whose disparate desires are mutually exclusive, particu-
larly given the absolute intractability of nature to the expecta-
tions of rational agents. Because what is good for a lion and 
what is good for the lion’s prey are manifestly in opposition, to 
recognize the rights of all nonhuman animals with final goods 
would seemingly eliminate any chance of actually achieving 
the Kingdom of Ends on Earth wherein everyone’s goods are 
realized (8.8.3). But to this, Korsgaard responds that a consis-
tent treatment of Kantian principles would not necessarily need 
to actually accomplish a comprehensive Kingdom of Ends so 
long as all living agents are persistently acting properly; as she 
says, “we do not do what is right in order to achieve the good, 
but in order to treat others in a way that accords with their val-
ue” (8.8.4).
The third and final part of Fellow Creatures stretches the 
sentiment of this last quote in a smattering of different di-
rections as Korsgaard suggests applied considerations of her 
reformed-Kantian framework for defending animal rights. 
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Addressing topics ranging from the eating of meat to animal 
experimentation, service creatures in the military, the keeping 
of pets, and more, Korsgaard raises more questions than she 
answers in this section as she muses in a matter of paragraphs 
over topics which each deserve their own extended treatment. 
One issue she centers, in 10.3.1, for example, is the tension 
between activists who push to eradicate predation in the wild 
(effectively requiring all creatures to become domesticated) and 
activists who support the organized extinction of bred animals 
(effectively requiring all creatures to become feral). By devel-
oping what she calls a ‘creation ethic,’ Korsgaard contends that 
both sides of this debate fall prey to the same category mistake, 
albeit in different directions: we are not responsible for the cre-
ation of wild animals, so domesticating and controlling them 
would be improper, but we are (in one sense) responsible for the 
creation of domesticated creatures, so allowing them all to die 
- even by natural causes - would be to neglect that unique duty. 
Moreover, because there is a difference, Korsgaard argues, 
between “substituting one state of affairs for another, and cre-
ating a state of affairs from scratch” (10.4.4) it is impossible 
to do anything to a population of living creatures simply ‘for 
the sake of’ some hypothetical future set of creatures. Calling 
this a problem of ‘gentrification,’ Korsgaard raises the worry 
that benefits experienced by the creatures of tomorrow cannot 
justify the mistreatment of creatures today - especially when 
those two sets of creatures are populated by entirely different 
individuals (10.4.5). Such gentrification, though justifiable on 
consequentialist grounds, fails to treat the creatures who are 
currently alive as respectable ends-in-themselves.
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But perhaps the single largest surprise in this thought-pro-
voking book comes in the final chapter when Korsgaard bluntly 
denies Kant’s famous dictum that “ought implies can” (12.1.3). 
Because she assigns Kant’s optimism about the potential instan-
tiation of the Kingdom of Ends on Earth to his theology (6.5.2), 
Korsgaard believes that, in the absence of that theology, there 
is simply no reason to think that “there must be some guaran-
tee that morality and nature are going to fit together somehow” 
(12.1.3). Instead, Korsgaard treats the products of deductive 
ethical reasoning more like pragmatic tools than divine laws 
and draws a distinction between two ways of reading Kant’s 
dictum: the connection between blameworthiness and agen-
cy (“can’t, therefore not-blameworthy” perhaps) is altogether 
different from a positive obligation in itself (“can, therefore 
should”). These two distinct variations of “ought implies can” 
are not clearly delineated and too quickly passed over in this 
text - hopefully, Korsgaard and others will continue to unravel 
the thread of this tantalizing dichotomy in future work.
There is much to be commended in Fellow Creatures, both 
in what I have summarized, as well as what I have had to ne-
glect; Korsgaard addresses, for example, more complicated no-
tions of desert (6.5), general criticisms of utilitarianism (9), the 
improper prioritization of type-Creatures over token individu-
als (11.6), the morality of human extinction (11.9), and other fas-
cinating topics which each deserve their own monograph. In so 
doing, and by presenting her notions of ‘tetheredness’ and the 
incorporation of quasi-teleological goodness into a deontologi-
cal framework, Korsgaard has charted many potential courses 
for the next generation of Kantian moral theorists as they con-
tinue to explore how “morality is just the human way of being 
an animal” (8.6.1).
